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Checklist de préparation SAFR: Évaluation des lacunes pour la gouvernance de l'IA agentique

35 questions construites à partir du livre blanc MAS BuildFin.ai. Évaluées dans votre navigateur. Sans inscription.

Safeguards for Agentic Finance at Runtime (SAFR) est le livre blanc publié en juillet 2026 par l'initiative BuildFin.ai de la MAS, rédigé avec Ant International, Circle, HSBC, J.P. Morgan Chase, Manulife, Mastercard, OCBC et Visa. Il décrit une couche de gouvernance à l'exécution qui se situe entre un agent IA et les systèmes sur lesquels il agit, et fixe une norme unique pour chaque action proposée : « aucune action agentique n'atteint l'exécution sans avoir été déclarée, autorisée et évaluée ».

Cette checklist traduit cette norme en 35 questions réparties sur huit sections, suivant les quatre composants d'exécution du livre blanc (Identité de l'agent, Référentiel de contrôles, Moteur de disposition, Journal d'audit) ainsi que son traitement des mandats, des enveloppes de gouvernance, de l'escalade et du déploiement. Chaque question nomme la preuve qu'un évaluateur demanderait, de sorte qu'une réponse Oui signifie que vous pouvez produire l'artefact cette semaine.

Répondez Oui, Partiel ou Non. Les scores se calculent dans votre navigateur, par section et au global. L'ensemble des questions est sur cette page ; l'inscription par e-mail ne s'applique qu'au téléchargement de la feuille de calcul modifiable. Si le cadre vous est nouveau, commencez par SAFR expliqué. Une fois votre score obtenu, le guide de mise en œuvre SAFR explique comment combler chaque lacune, et la page mise en œuvre SAFR montre comment KLA Control Plane s'aligne sur le cadre.

SAFR readiness: 0%

Assessed 0/35 · 0 gaps

Agent inventory and identity

SAFR's Agent Identity component binds each proposed action to a recognized, registered agent, verified against a registry entry before any other evaluation proceeds.

Do you maintain a complete inventory of every AI agent able to initiate actions against production systems: payments, trading orders, credit approvals, regulatory filings, claims?

Do you maintain a complete inventory of every AI agent able to initiate actions against production systems: payments, trading orders, credit approvals, regulatory filings, claims?

Evidence: An export of the inventory listing each agent, the systems it acts on, and its current release state.

SAFR A1

Does every agent in that inventory have a named human owner accountable for its behavior?

Does every agent in that inventory have a named human owner accountable for its behavior?

Evidence: The registry records showing an owner field populated with a named individual for each agent.

SAFR A2

Is every agent versioned, so any past action can be traced to the specific agent version that produced it?

Is every agent versioned, so any past action can be traced to the specific agent version that produced it?

Evidence: The version history for one agent, and a sample action record referencing the version that acted.

SAFR A3

Where an agent could appear in more than one registry (an internal registry, a payment network's agent registry, an inter-institutional directory) have you determined which registry is authoritative?

Where an agent could appear in more than one registry (an internal registry, a payment network's agent registry, an inter-institutional directory) have you determined which registry is authoritative?

Evidence: A written designation of the authoritative registry per agent class, or confirmation that all agents operate in a closed-loop environment against a single internal registry.

SAFR A4

Is agent identity verified against the registry at runtime, before each proposed action is evaluated, with verification failures rejected and logged?

Is agent identity verified against the registry at runtime, before each proposed action is evaluated, with verification failures rejected and logged?

Evidence: A log entry for a rejected action showing failed identity verification as the recorded basis.

SAFR A5

Mandates and authorization

The paper defines a mandate as "the mechanism through which a user defines the bounds of the authority delegated to an agent": explicit, structured, and machine-readable.

Is the authority delegated to each agent recorded as an explicit, machine-readable mandate stating what the agent may do, within what limits, and under what conditions?

Is the authority delegated to each agent recorded as an explicit, machine-readable mandate stating what the agent may do, within what limits, and under what conditions?

Evidence: One production mandate in the machine-readable form the runtime actually consumes, with the issuing principal identified.

SAFR B1

Are the action types each agent may initiate enumerated in its mandate, with a scope the agent cannot extend through its own reasoning or inference?

Are the action types each agent may initiate enumerated in its mandate, with a scope the agent cannot extend through its own reasoning or inference?

Evidence: The mandate's permitted action-type list, plus a test or log showing an out-of-scope action rejected at the checkpoint.

SAFR B2

Is delegation depth defined, who may delegate authority to whom, and how many links a delegation chain may carry?

Is delegation depth defined, who may delegate authority to whom, and how many links a delegation chain may carry?

Evidence: The authorization rules covering delegation, with the maximum chain depth stated.

SAFR B3

Does every mandate carry a validity period, with actions proposed after expiry rejected until the mandate is renewed?

Does every mandate carry a validity period, with actions proposed after expiry rejected until the mandate is renewed?

Evidence: A mandate showing its validity window, and the outcome recorded for an action proposed after expiry.

SAFR B4

Can a mandate be revoked or suspended with immediate effect, applying from the next proposed action?

Can a mandate be revoked or suspended with immediate effect, applying from the next proposed action?

Evidence: The revocation procedure, and a test record showing an action under a revoked mandate rejected.

SAFR B5

Controls repository

The Controls Repository is the institution's configurable rulebook, drawn from organizational policies, regulatory requirements, product rules, and user-provided mandates.

Are the controls governing agent actions held in one designated repository, and does the runtime evaluation read from it?

Are the controls governing agent actions held in one designated repository, and does the runtime evaluation read from it?

Evidence: The repository location, and a configuration or trace showing the evaluation path retrieves controls from it.

SAFR C1

Is every control versioned, so any past decision can be traced to the exact control version in force when it was made?

Is every control versioned, so any past decision can be traced to the exact control version in force when it was made?

Evidence: The version history for one control, and a decision record citing the version applied.

SAFR C2

Is publishing a control change a governed release, reviewed and approved by a second person before it takes effect?

Is publishing a control change a governed release, reviewed and approved by a second person before it takes effect?

Evidence: The approval record for the most recent control change, showing author and approver as different people.

SAFR C3

Do the controls cover all four sources SAFR names: organizational policies, regulatory requirements, product rules, and user-provided mandates?

Do the controls cover all four sources SAFR names: organizational policies, regulatory requirements, product rules, and user-provided mandates?

Evidence: One example control per source, mapped to its origin in the repository.

SAFR C4

Disposition engine

The Disposition Engine evaluates each in-scope action against the retrieved controls, producing "a defined, binding outcome for every proposed action calibrated to the specific risk it presents."

Is every in-scope proposed action evaluated deterministically against the controls before it executes: identical envelope, mandate, and control version producing an identical outcome?

Is every in-scope proposed action evaluated deterministically against the controls before it executes: identical envelope, mandate, and control version producing an identical outcome?

Evidence: An execution trace showing the checkpoint positioned ahead of the action with no bypass route, plus a repeat-evaluation test confirming determinism.

SAFR D1

Can the evaluation return all four SAFR dispositions: Deny, Escalate, Auto-Execute, and Observe?

Can the evaluation return all four SAFR dispositions: Deny, Escalate, Auto-Execute, and Observe?

Evidence: One logged decision of each type, or configuration showing all four outcomes reachable.

SAFR D2

Does every outcome record the specific rules applied and a machine-readable reason for the result?

Does every outcome record the specific rules applied and a machine-readable reason for the result?

Evidence: A decision record showing rule identifiers and reason codes alongside the outcome.

SAFR D3

Are the thresholds that assign outcomes calibrated on the factors SAFR names: action reversibility, financial materiality, customer impact severity, regulatory sensitivity, and novelty?

Are the thresholds that assign outcomes calibrated on the factors SAFR names: action reversibility, financial materiality, customer impact severity, regulatory sensitivity, and novelty?

Evidence: The calibration parameters for one agent Process, with the rationale recorded for each threshold.

SAFR D4

If the evaluation service is unreachable or errors, is the proposed action blocked by default?

If the evaluation service is unreachable or errors, is the proposed action blocked by default?

Evidence: A failover or chaos test record showing an action held or rejected while evaluation was unavailable.

SAFR D5

Governance envelope and lineage

Before an action executes it is packaged in a Governance Envelope (the action, the trace of how the agent arrived at it, and the context needed to assess it) "treated as a document to be authenticated against its origin."

Does each proposed action carry a trace of the actual steps the agent executed in arriving at it: tool calls made, data retrieved, checks performed?

Does each proposed action carry a trace of the actual steps the agent executed in arriving at it: tool calls made, data retrieved, checks performed?

Evidence: A captured action trace for one production or pilot action, showing the ordered tool-call sequence.

SAFR E1

Does the envelope carry context metadata: the agent identity, the applicable mandate, current account or system state, and operative policy constraints?

Does the envelope carry context metadata: the agent identity, the applicable mandate, current account or system state, and operative policy constraints?

Evidence: A sample envelope with all four metadata fields populated.

SAFR E2

Is the envelope authenticated against its origin, so a trace and action declared together by a compromised agent would be caught before evaluation?

Is the envelope authenticated against its origin, so a trace and action declared together by a compromised agent would be caught before evaluation?

Evidence: A description of the authentication mechanism (for example, envelope assembly at an interception point in the execution path) and the adversarial test that exercised it.

SAFR E3

Can the full lineage of any completed action be reconstructed afterward: every step, decision, and data access, in order, from the stored record alone?

Can the full lineage of any completed action be reconstructed afterward: every step, decision, and data access, in order, from the stored record alone?

Evidence: A lineage reconstruction for one past action, produced without reference to application logs or to the agent itself.

SAFR E4

Escalation operations

SAFR names three operational dimensions for escalation (volume, turnaround, and reviewer authority) and warns that ad hoc escalation yields "the appearance of human oversight without the substance of it."

Does an escalated action pause and route to a named, authorized reviewer as a structured decision request with the full action context attached?

Does an escalated action pause and route to a named, authorized reviewer as a structured decision request with the full action context attached?

Evidence: One escalation record showing the held action, the assigned reviewer, and the context packaged with the request.

SAFR F1

Do reviewers hold clear authority to approve, modify, or decline, with their decisions carrying the same institutional weight as the original agent decision?

Do reviewers hold clear authority to approve, modify, or decline, with their decisions carrying the same institutional weight as the original agent decision?

Evidence: A role definition granting reviewers that authority, with their decisions binding on the Process.

SAFR F2

Is maker-checker separation enforced by the system, barring the initiator of an action from approving it?

Is maker-checker separation enforced by the system, barring the initiator of an action from approving it?

Evidence: A test record showing a self-approval attempt rejected by the platform.

SAFR F3

Does every escalation carry a timeout window with a defined default when no decision arrives in time: block, or escalation to a senior reviewer?

Does every escalation carry a timeout window with a defined default when no decision arrives in time: block, or escalation to a senior reviewer?

Evidence: The timeout and default outcome configured per decision class, with coverage rules for overnight and weekend hours.

SAFR F4

Have you sized expected escalation volume against actual reviewer capacity, including peak periods?

Have you sized expected escalation volume against actual reviewer capacity, including peak periods?

Evidence: A volume forecast at expected traffic set beside the reviewer roster, with turnaround data from a pilot or production period.

SAFR F5

Audit and evidence

The Audit Log is the record every other component feeds: "the authoritative record, independent of any party with an interest in how events are characterised after the fact."

Is every governance decision (all four outcomes, including Auto-Execute and Observe) written to an append-only, tamper-evident log?

Is every governance decision (all four outcomes, including Auto-Execute and Observe) written to an append-only, tamper-evident log?

Evidence: The log design (hash chaining or equivalent) and one sample entry per outcome type.

SAFR G1

Does each entry capture what SAFR requires: the envelope as submitted, the mandate checked against, the outcome, the specific rules applied, the basis for the outcome, and the time elapsed at each stage?

Does each entry capture what SAFR requires: the envelope as submitted, the mandate checked against, the outcome, the specific rules applied, the basis for the outcome, and the time elapsed at each stage?

Evidence: One complete log entry showing all six elements.

SAFR G2

Can you export the governance record for a given agent, period, or case in a form an auditor or supervisor can work with?

Can you export the governance record for a given agent, period, or case in a form an auditor or supervisor can work with?

Evidence: One export produced end to end, with the elapsed time to produce it.

SAFR G3

Can a third party verify the integrity of an exported record without access to your systems?

Can a third party verify the integrity of an exported record without access to your systems?

Evidence: An offline verification run against an exported bundle, with the verifier's output attached.

SAFR G4

Deployment pattern

SAFR defines two integration patterns (native instrumentation and gateway interception) and requires per-action authorization across multi-step work.

Have you chosen an integration pattern for each part of the agent estate: native instrumentation for agents you build, gateway interception for existing and third-party agents?

Have you chosen an integration pattern for each part of the agent estate: native instrumentation for agents you build, gateway interception for existing and third-party agents?

Evidence: The pattern decision recorded per agent class, with the rationale for each.

SAFR H1

Does a coverage plan establish governance over the existing agent estate first, with native instrumentation following for new builds?

Does a coverage plan establish governance over the existing agent estate first, with native instrumentation following for new builds?

Evidence: The rollout plan listing every currently ungoverned agent and its target coverage date.

SAFR H2

In multi-step Processes, is each action authorized independently, with an Auto-Execute or Observe outcome at one step carrying no authority into the next?

In multi-step Processes, is each action authorized independently, with an Auto-Execute or Observe outcome at one step carrying no authority into the next?

Evidence: A multi-step run record showing a separate evaluation and outcome at every step.

SAFR H3

Prioritised gaps
35 item(s) to address
  • Do you maintain a complete inventory of every AI agent able to initiate actions against production systems: payments, trading orders, credit approvals, regulatory filings, claims? , Not assessed
  • Does every agent in that inventory have a named human owner accountable for its behavior? , Not assessed
  • Is every agent versioned, so any past action can be traced to the specific agent version that produced it? , Not assessed
  • Where an agent could appear in more than one registry (an internal registry, a payment network's agent registry, an inter-institutional directory) have you determined which registry is authoritative? , Not assessed
  • Is agent identity verified against the registry at runtime, before each proposed action is evaluated, with verification failures rejected and logged? , Not assessed
  • Is the authority delegated to each agent recorded as an explicit, machine-readable mandate stating what the agent may do, within what limits, and under what conditions? , Not assessed
  • Are the action types each agent may initiate enumerated in its mandate, with a scope the agent cannot extend through its own reasoning or inference? , Not assessed
  • Is delegation depth defined, who may delegate authority to whom, and how many links a delegation chain may carry? , Not assessed
  • Does every mandate carry a validity period, with actions proposed after expiry rejected until the mandate is renewed? , Not assessed
  • Can a mandate be revoked or suspended with immediate effect, applying from the next proposed action? , Not assessed
  • Are the controls governing agent actions held in one designated repository, and does the runtime evaluation read from it? , Not assessed
  • Is every control versioned, so any past decision can be traced to the exact control version in force when it was made? , Not assessed
  • + 23 more in the export.

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Comment lire votre score

Oui = 2, Partiel = 1, Non = 0. Les scores sont des pourcentages des points disponibles, par section et au global.

Lacunes fondamentales
0–39 %

Les scores dans cette tranche indiquent des structures manquantes : un inventaire des agents avec des propriétaires nommés, des mandats lisibles par machine, et un point de contrôle qui évalue les actions avant leur exécution. Tant qu'elles n'existent pas, le calibrage des dispositions et l'outillage de preuve n'ont rien à quoi s'attacher. Commencez par les sections A et B: recensez chaque agent capable d'initier une action, nommez un propriétaire pour chacun, et consignez son autorité déléguée sous forme de mandat. Le guide de mise en œuvre SAFR ordonne ce travail.

Couverture partielle
40–75 %

Les structures essentielles existent, avec des lacunes qu'un évaluateur trouverait dès la première heure : des contrôles dispersés dans le code des agents, des escalades sans délai par défaut, un registre d'audit qu'aucune partie externe ne peut vérifier. Traitez d'abord la section la moins bien notée ; chaque section correspond à un chantier dans le guide de mise en œuvre. Réévaluez après chaque chantier.

Prêt pour le pilote
76–100 %

Les structures décrites par SAFR sont substantiellement en place. Le travail restant relève du calibrage : seuils de disposition ajustés sur le trafic réel, volume d'escalade dimensionné à la capacité des réviseurs, exports de preuves testés avec les auditeurs qui les utiliseront. Un pilote encadré de quatre semaines sur un workflow d'agent est une prochaine étape réaliste ; la page mise en œuvre SAFR en présente un, semaine par semaine.

Transformez le score en session de travail

Une revue de lacunes de 30 minutes confronte vos sections les moins bien notées à KLA Control Plane, qui met en œuvre le modèle SAFR et est déployé dès aujourd'hui. La revue reprend vos scores par section et associe chaque lacune à un contrôle précis.

Réservez une revue de lacunes SAFR de 30 minutes

Téléchargez la checklist modifiable

Les mêmes 35 questions sous forme de feuille de calcul : une ligne par question avec sa note de preuve, ainsi que des colonnes Statut, Responsable et Notes et un calcul par section. Conçue pour les revues de lacunes internes.

Utilisé pour envoyer le fichier et pour un seul suivi au maximum.

À propos du cadre

SAFR (Safeguards for Agentic Finance at Runtime) a été publié en juillet 2026 par l'initiative BuildFin.ai de la MAS, rédigé avec huit acteurs du secteur dont HSBC, J.P. Morgan Chase, Mastercard et Visa. C'est une approche de référence que les établissements peuvent mettre en œuvre au sein de leur propre infrastructure. Le livre blanc précise qu'il « ne constitue pas une orientation réglementaire ni des attentes prudentielles ».

SAFR expliqué, le cadre complet

Ce que produit un score réussi

Une mise en œuvre bien notée ici peut remettre à un évaluateur quatre artefacts sur demande : un registre de décision avec des motifs lisibles par machine, une trace reconstituable des étapes réellement suivies par l'agent, un registre d'approbation nommant le réviseur et sa justification, et un export de preuves qu'un tiers peut vérifier hors ligne. Les sections D à G testent chacun de ces éléments.

Mise en œuvre SAFR, composant par composant

Combler les lacunes

KLA Control Plane met en œuvre le modèle SAFR, déployé dès aujourd'hui : Agent Registry pour l'identité, Policy Builder pour le référentiel de contrôles, KLA Policy Engine pour les dispositions, Audit Trail pour le registre de preuves. Une session de trente minutes couvre un déroulement gouverné de bout en bout : politique, décision, escalade, preuve scellée.

FAQ

Questions fréquentes

S'agit-il d'une évaluation officielle de la MAS ?

Non. Il s'agit d'une auto-évaluation construite à partir des structures définies par le livre blanc SAFR, sans statut officiel. SAFR lui-même est une référence sectorielle (le livre blanc précise qu'il « ne constitue pas une orientation réglementaire ni des attentes prudentielles ») et chaque établissement reste responsable de déterminer comment son déploiement s'aligne sur les attentes prudentielles applicables et ses exigences de gouvernance internes. KLA est indépendant de la MAS et de BuildFin.ai.

Quand faut-il répondre Partiel ?

Répondez Partiel lorsque la capacité couvre une partie du parc d'agents, ne fonctionne qu'en pilote, ou existe sans la preuve nommée sous la question. La note de preuve est le test : Oui signifie que vous pourriez remettre l'artefact à un évaluateur cette semaine.

Qui doit remplir la checklist ?

Trois rôles suffisent : le responsable de la plateforme d'agents, le responsable des contrôles de conformité concernés, et le responsable de l'opération de revue. Chaque question se répond par Oui, Partiel ou Non, donc un premier passage est rapide ; les notes de preuve sont là où le vrai temps de revue se joue. Les scores se calculent dans votre navigateur ; l'inscription par e-mail ne s'applique qu'au téléchargement de la feuille de calcul.

Que faire des lacunes révélées par le score ?

Traitez d'abord la section la moins bien notée. Chaque section correspond à un chantier dans le guide de mise en œuvre SAFR ; réévaluez après chaque chantier et la répartition par section montrera où le score a évolué. Une lacune est considérée comme comblée lorsque vous pouvez produire l'artefact de preuve nommé sous sa question.

Avertissement : Auto-évaluation par rapport à Safeguards for Agentic Finance at Runtime, livre blanc v1.0 (juillet 2026), MAS BuildFin.ai. Les passages cités sont protégés par le droit d'auteur de la Monetary Authority of Singapore. SAFR est une référence sectorielle et ne constitue pas une orientation réglementaire ni des attentes prudentielles. KLA est indépendant de la MAS et de BuildFin.ai, et n'est affilié à, approuvé par, ni certifié par aucun des deux.

Checklist de préparation SAFR (MAS) : évaluation gratuite des lacunes en gouvernance IA agentique | KLA